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1Thesis
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Featured Case Study: JP Morgan Chase
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4Abstract
Mergers and acquisitions have become the most frequently 
used methods of growth for companies in the twenty first 
century. They present a company with a potentially larger 
market share and open it up to a more diversified market. A 
merger is considered to be successful, if it increases the 
acquiring firm’s value; most mergers have actually been known 
to benefit both competition and consumers by allowing firms 
to operate more efficiently. However, it has to be noted that 
some mergers and acquisitions have the capacity to decrease 
competition in various ways.
The merger between JP Morgan Chase and Bank One 
presented JP Morgan Chase with the opportunity to expand its 
perspective through providing the firm with access to retail
banking markets and clientele in the regions where its 
previous exposure had been virtually inexistent. The merger 
gave the firm that extra growth and competitive edge that it 
was looking for to compete with Citigroup and other rivals. 
Research has shown, that due to increasing advances in 
technology and banking processes, which make transactions, 
among other aspects of business, more effective and 
efficient, mergers and acquisitions have become more frequent 
today then ever before. 
The topic of mergers and acquisitions is extremely 
complicated, with the numerous types of mergers that are out 
there today. It is also remarkably interesting, with the 
controversies and fierce price wars, which surround most 
mergers and acquisitions.  
5In the world of growing economy and globalization, major 
companies on both domestic and international markets struggle 
to achieve the optimum market share possible. Every day 
business people from top to lower management work to achieve 
a common goal – being the best at what you do, and getting 
there as fast as possible. As companies work hard to beat 
their competitors they assume various tactics to do so. Some 
of their tactics may include competing in the market of their 
core competence, thus, insuring that they have the optimal 
knowledge and experience to have a fighting chance against 
their rivals in the same business; hostile takeovers; or the 
most popular way to achieve growth and dominance – mergers 
and acquisitions. 
Mergers and acquisitions are the most frequently used 
methods of growth for companies in the twenty first century. 
Mergers and acquisitions present a company with a potentially
larger market share and open it up to a more diversified 
market. At times, a merger or an acquisition simply makes a 
company larger, expands its staff and production, and gives 
it more financial and other resources to be a stronger 
competitor on the market. 
To define this topic more clearly, let me state that a 
corporate merger, as defined by the “Quick MBA” reference 
website, is the combination of the assets and liabilities of 
6two firms to form a single business entity. In everyday 
language, the term "acquisition" tends to be used when a 
larger firm absorbs a smaller firm, and "merger" tends to be 
used when the combination is portrayed to be between equals. 
In case of a merger between two firms that are approximately 
equal, there often is an exchange of stock in which one firm 
issues new shares to the shareholders of the other firm at a 
certain ratio. It has been customary that the firm whose 
shares continue to exist, even if that occurs under an 
alternate company name, is referred to as the acquiring firm 
and the firm whose shares are being replaced by the acquiring 
firm is usually called the target firm. You can refer to the 
appendix of this thesis to find the formula for the pre-
merger stock price. 
A merger is considered to be successful, if it increases 
the acquiring firm’s value. Clearly, judging from the various 
statistics charts found in the appendix, there is a 
considerable amount of companies in the United States which 
believe that a merger will increase their company’s value. 
An article which was recently published by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) noted that the United States is 
heavily involved in the so called right "merger wave." The 
number of mergers reported rose from “1,529 in 1991 to a 
record 3,702 in 1997 - a 142 percent jump.” During this 
7period, the FTC spent a great amount of time on 
distinguishing and at times preventing mergers which were 
potentially anticompetitive and directed at forming 
monopolies. This is a great example of the strong controls 
that the United States government has instituted, in order to 
prevent companies from forming monopolies, so that our 
financial markets will stay unpolluted and healthy 
competition can continue to thrive. It also shows that the 
topic of mergers is extremely controversial at times and 
involves a great number of legal aspects in order for any 
merger to become finalized. 
Most mergers have actually been known to benefit both 
competition and consumers by allowing firms to operate more 
efficiently. However, it has to be noted that some mergers 
and acquisitions have the capacity to decrease competition. 
This is very dangerous for both us, the consumers, and the 
companies on the market, because declines in competition may 
cause higher prices, decreased availability of goods or 
services, products of lower quality, as well as declines in 
innovation. This is mainly due to some companies merging and 
creating a more concentrated market, with fewer suppliers, 
which leads to fewer options for the consumers, and thus 
gives some companies the advantage of raising prices since 
the consumers have no other choice of suppliers. This is even 
8more crucial to realize in the case of companies which 
produce goods that have no or very few substitutes, and for 
which the demand is highly inelastic.
In a concentrated market, there are very few firms, by 
definition. The danger of a concentrated market is that in 
this case, it becomes easier for companies to stall 
competition by colluding. For example, some companies might
agree on the prices they will charge their customers. 
Collusion can be of either of the two forms: by tacit 
agreement or by explicit agreement. As one may have guessed, 
tacit agreements are hidden and are kept a secret, while 
explicit ones are less subtle in their form. Obviously, 
corporations that want to become involved in collusion, use 
tacit agreements, which are harder to be uncovered by the law 
enforcement, since explicit agreements are prosecutable by 
law.   
Usually, a merger can be construed as being anti 
competitive if it makes the market very saturated after the 
merger, as opposed to before the merger’s completion, and if 
the merger in addition makes it impossible or highly 
difficult for new firms to enter the market and present a 
challenge to the existing corporations. Companies who do 
this, want to keep other companies out of the market because 
the new entrants have the capacity to offer lower prices, 
9forcing the existing firms to lower theirs as well, thus 
driving all of the prices in that market down.
Going deeper into the subject of mergers, it is 
important to present and distinguish between three kinds of 
mergers: horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, and potential 
competition or conglomerate mergers. 
By definition, a horizontal merger is an acquisition of 
a competitor with an intention to increase the market 
concentration, and often also to increase the probability of 
collusions. A vivid example of this was Staples’ attempt to 
merge with Home Depot. This merger would have created a more 
condensed market for office and home supplies, because the 
number of stores nationwide would have decreased, making it 
possible for Staples to set their own prices.
Research has shown that “Staples would have been able to 
keep prices up to 13 percent higher after the merger than 
without the merger.” Fortunately for all of the consumers of 
both stores nation wide, the Federal Trade Commission 
prevented the merger from taking place, allegedly, saving 
consumers “an estimated $1.1 billion over five years.”
In retrospect, a vertical merger is said to take place 
when companies are in a so called buyer-seller relationship. 
For example, when a company moves along its value chain and 
merges with its supplier, or distributor. As would be the 
10
case if a pencil making company would merge with the 
woodcutting company, or with the store that sells pencils. A 
vertical merger can impair competition by preventing other 
companies who use the same suppliers or distribution channels 
to operate normally. If companies A, B, and C both use 
supplier Y and no other effective supplier exists, and 
company A merges with supplier Y, this forces companies B and 
C out of business, because they have lost their connection 
with supplies Y. Company A has thus eliminated two of its 
competitors, companies B and C. 
A potential competition or conglomerate merger is said 
to take place when one company merges or buys another company 
that is anticipated to enter a market and become a potential 
competitor to the acquiring company. It is said to be a so 
called elimination technique of a company’s potential 
competitors. A conglomerate merger can be detrimental in two 
ways. First of all, this type of a merger deters healthy 
competition because it involves acquiring companies before 
they even enter the market. Second of all, it prevents the 
company that otherwise would have entered the market to make 
positive contributions to the market, such as promoting 
healthy competition or offering more diversified products to 
consumers. The reasoning behind this type of a merger is 
closely related to the first two types, namely to keep the 
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prices higher, without the threat of new competitors coming 
in and forcing the prices down, and to keep fierce 
competitors out. 
The Federal Trade Commission recently published the 
following article: “Several years ago, the Questar Corp., 
which operated the only pipeline transporting natural gas to 
Salt Lake City, tried to acquire a major part of a firm that 
was planning to begin service to the city. The potential 
entrant was already having a [positive] effect on pricing. 
The FTC blocked the merger, preserving the price benefits for 
Salt Lake City consumers.” Thus, one can see that 
corporations that try to prevent healthy competition are 
stopped in their tracks, and if Questar Corporation was 
successful in its conglomerate merger attempt, it could have 
set the price for transporting natural gas as high as 
possible, deterring competition, the economy, as well as 
consumers, because of the higher prices that would have been 
forced to pay due to this new conglomerate. 
The United Nations' “World Investment Report 2000”
suggests that the recent increase in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions is mainly due to increase in the globalization 
of markets. 
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If various statistical sources are combined it can be 
observed that domestic as well as worldwide mergers and 
acquisitions “have been growing at an average of 42% per year 
between 1980 and 1999, reaching $2.3 trillion dollars in 
value in 1999,” according to the World Investment Report as 
of the year 2000. “Such deals were worth about 0.3% of world 
gross domestic product in 1980, rising to 2% in 1990 and 8% 
in 1999. More than 24,000 [mergers and acquisitions] took 
place during the last 20 years.” 
The rapid growth has been overwhelming to both 
corporations involved and consumers. The increase in mergers 
has definitely been noticeable over the last couple of 
decades. Due to a major growth spurt of technological 
advances, news about mergers and acquisitions arrive to 
consumers and companies faster and more efficiently, with the 
most recent information available for anyone who is 
interested in the topic. Thousands of emails and faxes arrive 
to their destinations with the speed of lightning to notify 
us of companies’ plans and new conquests. The ease of 
communication has undoubtedly been a major factor in 
increasing mergers and acquisitions. 
Most mergers and acquisitions took place in developed 
countries, due to a larger number of strong corporations and 
well functioning economies in countries like United States 
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and European countries like United Kingdom. Cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions comprise a major part of the foreign 
direct investments or FDIs, which have also been developing 
quicker in the past decade. In fact they went from 37 billion 
dollars in 1982, to 800 billion dollars in 1999.
The World Investment Report makes the statement that 
there are three main forces that drive mergers and 
acquisitions, which incidentally coincide with my own 
previously made assumptions. These forces are rapid 
technological advances, new and more efficient ways of 
financing, and a more favorable regulatory setting.   
Statistics also show that in 1999, the United States
sustained a trend of being the most important target country 
in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, “with the EU 
accounting for four-fifths of the $233 billion dollars in 
assets that the US sold to foreigners.”
In addition, the World Investment Report presents that 
“70% of the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions”
in 1999 were made between competing firms in the same 
industry, or as noted previously, through horizontal mergers.
Vertical mergers remained far below 10% throughout the 1990s,
with the remaining mergers resulting from companies merging 
with other companies that operated in different markets from 
the acquiring corporation. 
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Furthermore, decreasing productive capacity has become 
important to companies. Companies that resulted from 
horizontal mergers usually do not expand their productive 
capacity once the merger is complete, even though it is 
possible in general, due to high potential expenses. The main 
goal of these mergers, which is reduction of competition 
often, then results in sacrifices of production capacities.
Thus, it is not uncommon that horizontal mergers mainly 
take place in automobiles, pharmaceuticals, as well as in 
telecommunications and banking industries. The World 
Investment Report supports this but saying that “in capital 
and technology-intensive activities, [companies decide to 
merge] to remain competitive by eliminating excess capacity 
and to spread huge investments. Horizontal mergers also take 
place in less technology-intensive industries like food, 
beverages and tobacco, textile and clothing ... to increase 
market power by reducing competition, realize economies of 
scale in marketing, distribution and procurement or to 
increase negotiating power [regarding] buyers and suppliers 
as well as financial institutions.” Thus companies merge also 
because they want to stay at the competitive edge in their 
respective markets and to grow exponentially in comparison to 
their competitors. 
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The following will serve as an overview of economic 
factors affecting mergers. As the main enforcer of the 
European Union’s competition policy, the European Commission 
has the power to make or break some of the world's largest
companies. The following discussion will outline the reasons 
and ways in which the European Commission decides on passing 
or stopping a merger within the European Union.  
The European Commission investigates the grounds for 
approving or rejecting a merger between two European 
companies, such as two airlines merging, or an Italian 
pharmaceutical company trying to overtake a French drug 
researcher. 
The main economic argument for accepting a merger is the 
so called static efficiency which represents mergers that 
result in economies of scale and thus reduce various costs 
for companies. 
Another economic factor which must be taken into account 
is dynamic efficiency which refers to profit increases that 
can be used for research and development of new products and 
for innovation, creating long term dynamic efficiency, which 
can also provide funds for capital investments. 
The survival of the fittest is usually determined by 
capital markets, which award companies that deliver promised 
benefits, and punish those who do not. If the success of the 
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mergers becomes questionable, corporate raiders carry out 
their function, and eliminate unproductive management which 
fails to earn sufficient returns for the shareholders, and 
thus makes the stock value drop. This simple technique makes 
management work harder and more efficiently in order to 
ensure their own job stability and stockholders’ wealth. 
It is said that this is a more effective technique than 
government involvement which can make matters worse because 
of the potential for government’s failure.
Growth of interest in the concept of a so called 
contestable market effectively complements the idea of the 
free market approach to mergers. By concentrating on removing 
entry barriers to a market, monopolies and mergers can only 
remain strong by producing high quality products efficiently.
Increasingly lower costs of production and operation, as 
well as larger businesses may give rise to increasing capital 
investments which also contribute to greater productive 
capacity.
Mergers and acquisitions can strengthen the competitive 
position of companies in the European Union with regard to 
the ones outside the union, by helping European companies 
within the union earn genuine dominance in the international 
markets. 
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The main economic argument for rejecting a merger is 
that mergers and acquisitions contribute to the risk of 
monopolies. Consumers then become exploited and resources 
become misallocated if these mergers create major entry 
barriers restricting competition, which can potentially lead
to market failure and a decline in economic welfare. From 
experience, there are today and probably will always be
barriers to free market entry. With times those barriers 
might increase with increasing demand for safety in warring 
nations, or with the growing influence of the Euro in the 
European countries.
The evidence is diverse as to whether mergers improve 
company’s performance. As times, companies make predictions 
for growth, increased efficiency, and greater profits. 
However, more often then not, those predictions prove to be 
over inflated, and this also leads to disappointments on the 
side of investors, shareholders and the management involved
in the merger.
There are certain imperfections in the capital markets 
which contribute to imperfect information and at times even 
merger failures. The reasons for market imperfections include 
the fact that often corporate control does not work 
optimally, and that unsuccessful management is in place for a 
long time. 
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Furthermore, shares are mainly held by financial 
institutions but while they are the owners, these 
institutions don’t run the companies on a day to day basis. 
This means that the classical conflict of agent and principal 
always holds and that the management will want to work in 
their own self interest rather then in the interest of 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. 
Statistics show that most of the cases and requests by 
companies for merger approvals referred to the European Union 
competition authorities are indeed accepted, and that only 
less then 20% of those cases referred to the European 
committee in the course of the last fourteen years ended up 
being rejected to due to valid reasons such as anti 
conglomerate protection and mergers which may restrict free 
competition if allowed. Thus the future for companies which 
are contemplating mergers is very promising, especially if 
those reasons are lawful and do not potentially restrict free 
competition.
It has been reported that in July of 2001 the European 
Commission blocked a 45 billion deal between US firms General 
Electric and Honeywell, both of which were American 
companies. Although competition authorities in the United 
States gave their approval to this deal, the European 
Commission expressed concerns that the merger between 
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Honeywell, whose core competency lies in avionics, and 
General Electric, whose main expertise was at the time in jet 
engines, would result in their combined dominance of the 
market. As a result the merger was stopped in its tracks in 
order to ensure and maintain healthy competition in the 
market. 
No matter how professional, promising and well crafted a 
merger may seem on paper, there are laws which are in place 
to regulate mergers. 
FDIC or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is an 
independent agency of the United States government 
established in 1933 which provides insurance for the banks’ 
depositors in case of the banks failures. In most cases, the 
insurance in case of bank failures is paid in the amount of 
100,000 dollars to the depositors of the bank which failed to
operate properly; this is one of the main functions of the 
FDIC. Other functions of this corporation include acting as a 
receiver for all suspended national and state banks upon 
request of the states, in which they operated; and preventing 
the formation and sustenance of unlawful and unethical 
banking practices.   
Under one of the acts of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) there is a Section 18(c) of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act, which is more widely known among 
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professionals as the Bank Merger Act, which states that 
“prior written approval of the FDIC [is required] before any 
insured depository institution can merge or consolidate with, 
purchase or otherwise acquire the assets of, or assume any 
deposit liabilities of, another insured depository 
institution if the resulting institution is to be a state 
nonmember bank, or merge or consolidate with, assume 
liability to pay any deposits or similar liabilities of, or 
transfer assets and deposits to, a noninsured bank or 
institution. Institutions undertaking one of the above 
described "merger transactions" must file an application with 
the FDIC.” 
This so called bank merger act makes sure that the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation doesn’t make the 
mistake of approving any mergers or acquisitions which may 
potentially create a monopoly, and eventually keep other 
businesses on the market from operating and freely competing 
properly. This act, in its entirety protects the markets and 
the consumers from being unfairly treated in the entire 
United States, and is therefore one of the most important 
merger acts out there. FDIC thus acts in the interests of the 
general public and weights the benefits to the public against 
the benefits to the market and to the company; if the ends do 
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not prove to justify the means, the merger or acquisition is 
declined for the obvious reasons. 
Another agency applicable under this topic and which is 
worth mentioning is the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
which is an agency in Britain whose responsibilities include
investigating and reporting on monopolies and on any 
intentions to form them by businesses. The Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission was established in 1948. Most of its 
present responsibilities and measures are outlined by the 
Fair Trading Act, the Competition Act, and by the 
Broadcasting Act established in 1973, 1980, and 1990 
respectively. 
The Fair Trading and the Competition acts are self 
explanatory by their names; both of them are in place to 
promote healthy competition and lawful trading, free of 
unfair or excessive tariffs or quotas. The Broadcasting Act 
refers to restricting the disclosure of private information 
regarding mergers and acquisitions through public means of 
information distribution. This is an important act, because 
it protects private information and restricts public 
information surrounding possible mergers and acquisitions. If 
improper information was to “leak out,” this might affect 
investors’ attitudes as well as public views on ongoing 
merger deals. 
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This commission is sponsored by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI), but it is said to be fully independent of 
the government. Its main purpose is to investigate 
monopolies, mergers, and potential anti-competitive practices 
of companies, much like the Bank Merger Act does; it also 
determines whether possible or existing mergers and 
acquisitions adversely affect public interest. Thus, to do 
so, it must consider the interests of the consumers with 
regard to quality and choice of products offered by 
companies, efficiency, innovation, as well as whether merging 
companies will not deter free market entry and effective 
employment in England. 
It must also be noted that the Fair Trading Act 
interprets a monopoly as a condition in which “at least 25 
percent of a particular good or service is supplied by a 
single entity or [a situation] in which 25 percent of the 
market is supplied by a non-interconnected group of entities 
which conduct their affairs in a way that distorts 
competition.” Under this definition, whenever such danger may 
exist, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission stops the 
potential mergers and acquisitions from going through, or 
intervenes in the activities of existing companies. This 
agency is a great control put into place to protect the 
public interest and effective competition.
23
Technological advances have played a key role in the 
increasing number of mergers in the 21st century. The idea of 
electronic mail, wire transfers, easy and efficient credit 
checks, and other wireless marvels have made the tasks of 
millions of businessmen much easier to handle. Because of 
these changes, mergers have become quicker and more 
efficient. Decisions and ideas get to their recipients at the 
blink of the eye, and senior management no longer relies on 
the post office to deliver important mail to their offices. 
Over the phone, or video conferencing have made the decision 
making process, as well as meeting arrangements easy and 
business smart. In the 21st century, business is done online, 
and over the phone, with blackberries and laptops, cell 
phones and digital mail; everything is fast and prompt. The 
prediction of many experts and researchers is that as we go 
forward, we will see even more mergers and acquisitions, 
favorable market conditions permitting, then ever before. 
Given that everything is legal and economically efficient, 
mergers will have even less obstacles to overcome, and only 
future will show whether that is a valuable contribution to 
our business and corporate infrastructure. 
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As a case in point, let me examine the recent merger 
between JP Morgan Chase and Bank One. July 1st marked the 
official “Day 1” for the competed merger between JP Morgan 
Chase and Bank One. Prior to this day, at midnight, these two 
companies officially merged to form an integrated new 
financial giant. 
The first part of this thesis clearly outlined the 
rationale and the general steps involved in a merger. As one 
will surely agree, this process is not only complex and 
multidimensional, but it is also challenging for people in 
all lines of businesses in both companies. Mergers take a 
toll on senior managers, in whose hands lie, the fate of 
their company and the fate of all the people who work in that 
company. Also, of course, the idea of mergers is alarming and 
sensitive for the people not included in the senior 
management team (and for multi business corporations, these 
people include anyone from vice presidents to assistants), 
due to their fear of job loss, or an anticipated potential 
shift in their position within the company. It is well known, 
that once companies merge, they often downsize to compensate 
for some of the transaction costs and other costs related to 
the merger. 
Being lucky enough to be present at the “Day 1” meeting 
on July 1st, as well as prior to this successful culmination 
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of the merger, I was able to observe first hand the tensions 
and the attitude of the firm (JP Morgan Chase) and of its 
people. 
Joining the firm just a few months before the merger was 
finalized, I had a unique chance to experience the atmosphere 
inside one of the most powerful financial corporations in 
America. Every day, internal newsletters came out to all of 
the employees of JP Morgan Chase in order to inform everyone 
of the new steps being taken by senior management towards the 
completion of the merger with Bank One, as well as to inform 
the staff of the senior management’s insights into the future 
for both corporations. 
This action is a very effective step on the part of 
senior management, not only because it keeps the merger on 
track and well organized, but more importantly, because it 
makes the people in the firm feel as though they are a part 
of the merger, which they rightfully so are, because everyone 
in the firm matters, and contributes in some way to the 
aggregate well being on the entire company. This action lets 
the people know that senior management thinks of them during 
the merger, and takes them into consideration when taking 
various actions on the merger. Furthermore, a discussion 
board was created on JP Morgan Chase’s website, in order for 
anyone internal to the firm to be able to ask questions, or 
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to voice any concerns with regard to the merger. The 
questions were answered promptly and respectfully by the 
management, and this proved once again that JP Morgan Chase 
not only cares about profitability, but also about its 
people. Even during the “Day 1” meeting, the discussions were 
open to the general internal public, and every question was 
given its due consideration and respect. 
Carefully following New York Times, the following three 
articles caught my attention.  
On April 22, 2004 the article heading “JP Morgan Chase 
reports 38% increase in earnings” made its way into the 
business section of the New York Times. The article mentioned 
this statistic with regard to JP Morgan Chase’s first quarter 
earnings. This accomplishment was then credited to the bank’s 
investment banking and market related businesses, which had 
offset the bank’s lower earnings from new mortgages and 
refinancing. The net income was reported to be “$1.9 billion, 
or 92 cents a share, at this point, compared with $1.4 
billion, or 69 cents a share,” a year earlier, as can also be 
noticed from the JP Morgan Chase annual report for the year 
2003, mentioned in the table of contents. Revenue for the 
first quarter was reported at “$8.98 billion, which was up 7 
percent from $8.41 billion” a year earlier.
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JP Morgan Chase’s increase in earnings reflects the 
profitability of the merger with Bank One. This positive 
change in earnings, as well as an increase in share value, 
also shows the stockholders’ and stakeholders’ support of the 
merger, which is always an important factor when it comes to 
a business altering senior management decisions, such as that 
of the merger with Bank One. 
On June 3, 2004, the article headline now read “JP 
Morgan vice president says he will retire.” Since the 
purchase of Bank One had now been relatively complete, Donald 
Layton, 54, a JP Morgan Chase and Company vice chairman and 
one of the three members of the bank’s office of the chairman 
decided to retire in order to pursue other opportunities. 
Layton was the most senior executive out of all senior 
executives at both Bank One and JP Morgan Chase, to resign 
since the merger was completed. Donald Layton oversaw JP 
Morgan Chase’s retail businesses, including the consumer
bank; transaction processing and information services 
businesses; and technology. After the merger, he would have 
overseen the finance, risk management and technology
divisions, and would have reported to the chief operating 
officer, James L. Dimon, now Bank One's chief executive. 
Those operations now report to Dimon directly.
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When these resignations take place, the discussions 
around them become very controversial, especially since in 
Layton’s case his role was not replaced my another senior 
figure, but overlooked, supported by the fact that now, the 
finance, risk management and technology divisions report 
directly to James Dimon, without the need of a middle figure. 
Surely, Donald Layton’s role in the company was essential, 
but to cut costs, the firm decided to pursue the strategy of 
division’s direct reporting to higher officials, which in no 
way reflects on the professional capabilities of Layton. 
Last but not least, on September 1, 2004, The New York 
Times article heading in the business sections read “JP 
Morgan and Bank One to merge mutual fund units.” The combined 
operation of the two mutual funds groups would then be placed 
under the supervision of the current head of JP Morgan funds, 
George C.W. Gatch. Subsequently, David Kundert, who was named 
the chairperson of the combined asset management unit in 
February, just after the agreement to merge with Bank One, 
will retire. JP Morgan Funds and One Group Mutual Funds are 
expected to become fully integrated into a single fund in 
February 2005.
This rearrangement of groups and of their heads is very 
confusing and time consuming, as well as costly. However, the 
example above perfectly illustrates the typical after -
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merger actions, which companies take to fully streamline and 
integrate their businesses into one fully functional and 
successful corporation. 
It is necessary to note that the words “merger” and 
“acquisition” are often interchanged, and in some instances, 
the “merger” between Bank One and JP Morgan Chase is referred 
to as JP Morgan Chase buying Bank One. From the financial 
standpoint, this case in point is not a true merger, but is 
in fact an acquisition, because, consistent with the 
definitions in the first part of the thesis, JP Morgan Chase 
fully “absorbed” Bank One, and thus is said to have acquired 
or even bought Bank One. In most publications, it is often 
customary to refer to such deals as mergers, because this 
sounds friendlier and more business like, rather then making 
this out to be a takeover. The “friendlier” formulation is 
easier to understand and to accept by every one concerned, as 
thus is introduced to the public at first as a merger. 
Given the previous history of “mergers” performed by JP 
Morgan Chase, one can easily notice that those were 
acquisitions, as in case of the merger between Chase 
Manhattan Bank and JP Morgan. Since Chase Manhattan Bank no 
longer exists, it is clear that although JP Morgan had said 
at the time that it will merge with the Chase Manhattan Bank, 
it obviously acquired it. 
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The $58 billion deal was officially closed and empowered 
in July. Before this event could take place, the balance 
sheets and the financial statements of JP Morgan Chase and 
Bank One needed to be integrated into single accounting 
statements; some business units were affected more than 
others within both companies, but the time which went into 
this accounting integration becomes evident after reviewing 
the annual reports of both corporations. The great detail of 
the annual reports reflects one of the many aspects and 
complexities of mergers between two major banks. 
However, before diving into the annual reports, and 
their sea of numbers, I want to first examine the reasoning 
behind JP Morgan’s acquisition of Bank One. 
A JP Morgan Chase press release dated January 14, 2004 
announced that JP Morgan Chase and Bank One had agreed to 
merge in a “strategic business combination establishing the 
second largest banking franchise in the United States, based 
on core deposits.” The combined company is expected to have 
assets of “$1.1 trillion, a strong capital base, over 2,300 
branches in seventeen states and top-tier positions in retail 
banking and lending, credit cards, investment banking, asset 
management, private banking, treasury and securities 
services, middle-market, and private equity.” With earnings 
contributions that are balanced out between retail and 
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wholesale banking, the combined company is expected to be 
“well-positioned to achieve strong and stable financial 
performance and increase shareholder value through its 
balanced business mix, greater scale, and enhanced 
efficiencies and competitiveness.” (JP Morgan Chase press 
release archives) 
The agreement, which was unanimously approved by the 
boards of directors of both companies, provided for a stock-
for-stock merger in which “1.32 shares of JP Morgan Chase 
common stock would be exchanged, on a tax-free basis, for 
each share of Bank One common stock.” Based on JP Morgan 
Chase's closing price of $39.22 on Wednesday, January 14, 
2004, the transaction would have a value of “approximately 
$51.77 for each share of Bank One common stock, and would 
create an enterprise with a combined market capitalization of 
approximately $130 billion.”
Under this agreement, the combined company will be 
headed by William B. Harrison, 60, as the chairman and chief 
executive officer, and by James Dimon, 47, as the president 
and chief operating officer, with Dimon to succeed Harrison 
as CEO in 2006 and Harrison continuing to serve as the 
chairman.
The merged company will be known as JP Morgan Chase & 
Co. It would continue to trade on the New York Stock
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Exchange, under the symbol JPM, and its corporate 
headquarters will still be located in New York. 
The JP Morgan brand will continue to be used for the 
wholesale business; and the combined company will continue to
use both brands (JP Morgan Chase and Bank One) in their 
respective markets and products. 
It is expected that the pretax cost savings of $2.2 
billion will be achieved over the next three years. The 
combined corporation is also expected to have “excess capital
and subject to Bank One board approval, Bank One expects to 
declare an increase in its quarterly dividend to $0.45 per 
share.”
Both company heads commented on the merger saying that 
"[the merger] will create one of the world's great financial 
services companies” (Harrison), and "the merger of Bank One 
and JP Morgan Chase makes tremendous sense strategically, 
operationally and financially” (Dimon). JP Morgan 
Chase is a leading global financial services firm with assets 
of $793 billion and operations in more than 50 countries. The 
firm is a leader in investment banking, financial services 
for consumers and businesses, financial transaction 
processing, investment management, private banking and 
private equity. It serves more than 30 million consumer 
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customers nationwide, and many of the world's most prominent 
corporate, institutional and government clients. 
Bank One is the nation's sixth-largest bank holding 
company, with assets of $290 billion. It currently has more 
than 51 million credit cards issued, and serves nearly 7 
million retail households and more than 20,000 middle market 
customers. It also manages $175 billion of clients' 
investment assets. (JP Morgan Chase press release) 
The merger between JP Morgan Chase and Bank One makes 
sense on multiple levels. Being the dominant bank in Chicago, 
Bank One opened up to JP Morgan Chase a retail banking 
market, to which JP Morgan Chase would not have been exposed 
to otherwise. As stated in the press release, JP Morgan Chase 
gained over 2000 branches and client exposure in areas in 
which it had not been as well known before; namely, a 
stronger presence in the credit card business, and branches 
in the Chicago area. By merging with Bank One, JP Morgan 
Chase gained market share and covered more ground on the map 
of the United States with its presence. 
As known in the financial industry, Citigroup it the 
biggest competitor of JP Morgan Chase. After the merger, JP 
Morgan Chase with Bank One as its ally, has a much bigger 
chance at beating its competition. Merging with Bank One, has 
given JP Morgan Chase access to a new and much more expanded 
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market without JP Morgan Chase’s having to specialize and 
spend its valuable assets in order to penetrate a new market, 
establish itself, build new branches, attract clients, and 
then compete with Bank One in the Chicago area. Rather then 
performing all of the steps above, JP Morgan Chase made the 
more valuable and financially sound choice of simply 
acquiring Bank One, which already has the expertise and the 
reputation in the area of retail banking. It thus cut out a 
potential competitor and simultaneously gained a new market 
in retail banking with readily developed experience in the 
area. 
Let us now proceed to a closer look at the financial 
statements of both JP Morgan Chase and Bank One. 
In the JP Morgan Chase annual report for the year 2002, 
one can clearly notice both losses and revenues across 
various businesses in the company. Being one of the leaders 
in the investment banking field in the beginning of the 21st
century, the investment bank disappointingly reported losses 
in both its operational revenues and earnings, which were 
approximately 12.4 million and 1.4 million dollars 
respectively; these, although, impressive numbers, were in 
fact a decline from the previous year, in which both 
operating revenues and earnings were higher – 14.6 million 
and 2.9 million respectively. JP Morgan Chase’s treasury and 
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securities services made a profit in comparison to 2001, 
reporting operating revenues at 4 million, and operating 
earnings at 0.7 million. IMPB or the investment management 
and private banking businesses reported operating revenues of 
2.8 million, and operating earnings of 0.4 million, which 
were in both cases declines from the previous year (2001). 
Even though JP Morgan Partners reported operating revenues at 
a (0.9) million, and operating losses at (0.8) million, they 
still did better then the year before, since they managed to 
reduce their losses. Chase financial Services reported 
operating revenues of 13.5 million, and operating earnings at 
2.5 million; both an improvement from 2001. In general, JP 
Morgan Chase’s revenues continued to improve throughout the 
year of 2002, closing at an impressive 29.6 million at the 
end of the year. However, the company’s net income declined 
slightly due to restructuring and an increase in noninterest 
expenses. The declines seen in some of the businesses above, 
such as the investment banking and the private banking fields 
are mainly due to performance issues highly sensitive to 
economic upheavals, such as those of September 11, 2001, and 
the stock market as well as the global capital market 
declines throughout the year. 
The fact that the return on equity remained stable at 
3.9% reflects that the company is working hard to maintain 
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its promises to its shareholders and that its revenues are 
still enough to cover any expected and unexpected expenses. 
As it is reported in the 2002 annual report of JP Morgan 
Chase, its biggest business contributions come from the 
investment bank and the Chase Financial Services, which was 
also the case in 2001. 
It is clear to see from other financial and social 
indicators reported in this annual report that JP Morgan at 
this point obviously needed something to give the company 
that extra push to get to the top of its competition, and 
historically, it is at these points that JP Morgan Chase 
would decides to merge with another bank, like it did in the 
case of Chase Manhattan bank. The merger now becomes even 
better justified because we see that JP Morgan Chase’s 
greatest contribution comes from the Chase Financial 
Services, which include the credit card business, and Bank 
One is that one complementing link which is able to improve 
JP Morgan’s greatest contributor by giving the company more 
credit card and retail customers. JP Morgan Chase thus made a 
very smart business move in expanding the corporation, its 
biggest contributor and its market exposure, all by merging 
with Bank One. 
Now taking a look at JP Morgan Chase’s annual report for 
2003 we see that reported revenues have increased even 
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further, to 33.3 million; net income made an incredible leap 
to 6.7 million, from being only 1.6 million just a year 
before (in 2002), while noninterest expenses remained 
relatively unchanged. Net income per share also tripled, 
reflecting the company’s improved performance. Higher 
revenues and higher earnings in 2003 definitely show that 
Bill Harrison’s promise to improve performance and execution 
is slowly becoming a reality. Even return on common equity 
doubled in comparison with 2002, reporting at 16% for 2003 
(being at only 8% just a year earlier). 
It is clear, that even before the merger was finalized 
in the summer of 2004, the promises made earlier by Bill 
Harrison of improved performance and of a stronger 
corporation, already began to shine through in JP Morgan 
Chase’s annual report for 2003. The rising returns and 
greater share prices also reflect that investors had an 
interest as well as trust in the better and brighter future 
for JP Morgan Chase. 
To complete the picture, JP Morgan Chase’s earnings 
release for the 3rd quarter of 2004 reports that for the 
Investment bank, operating revenues were at 2.7 million, and 
operating earnings were at 0.6 million for the 3rd quarter, 
both down 3% and 10% respectively, in comparison to the 
previous year; expenses were also reported to have increased 
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by 6% from the previous year, to becoming 1.9 million, an 
event which is normal due to increased expenses arising from 
the recent merger, since the investment bank was one of the 
more affected areas by the merger. Retail financial services 
thrived, with steep increase, as did the card services; an 
event which was to be expected after the merger, since Bank 
One expanded these areas in particular through the merger. 
Once again, these results further justify and support the 
merger. 
In addition, the consolidated financial highlights for 
JP Morgan Chase and Bank One, which are now one single 
accounting, financial and legal entity, and which can be 
found in the appendix of this thesis (in the 3rd quarter 
earnings release), report that revenues were up significantly 
from the 2nd quarter, as shown by the income statement; and 
total assets went up as well, as shown by the balance sheet, 
from 39% in the 2nd quarter to 44% in the 3rd quarter. 
It is evident from the data provided in the appendix, 
the highlights of which are presented above, that the merger 
between JP Morgan Chase and Bank One, or as can be read in 
the Merger Proposal, which was extended to the shareholders 
of JP Morgan Chase and Bank One – Bank One “merging into” JP 
Morgan Chase, thus signaling an acquisition of Bank One, that 
the acquisition was a very smart strategic move on the part 
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of both company heads. The acquisition has mainly benefited 
JP Morgan Chase by increasing its revenues, net income, card 
member services business, as well as its market share, as can 
be seen by JP Morgan Chase’s annual reports. It has made the 
company stronger and more equipped to compete with its number 
one rival – Citigroup. 
40
Mergers and acquisitions are the most frequently used 
methods of growth for companies in the twenty first century. 
They present a company with a potentially larger market share 
and open it up to a more diversified market. 
A merger is considered to be successful, if it increases 
the acquiring firm’s value. Clearly, judging from the various 
statistics charts found in the appendix, there is a 
considerable amount of companies in the United States which 
believe that a merger will increase their company’s value, 
and after reading this thesis, one can see that this is not 
always so. The evidence is diverse as to whether mergers 
improve company’s performance. As times, companies make 
predictions for growth, increased efficiency, and greater 
profits. There are certain imperfections in the capital 
markets which contribute to imperfect information and at 
times even merger failures.
Most mergers have actually been known to benefit both 
competition and consumers by allowing firms to operate more 
efficiently. However, it has to be noted that some mergers 
and acquisitions have the capacity to decrease competition. 
Usually, a merger can be construed as being anti 
competitive if it makes the market very saturated after the 
merger, as opposed to before the merger’s completion, and if 
the merger in addition makes it impossible or highly 
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difficult for new firms to enter the market and present a 
challenge to the existing corporations.
Going deeper into the subject of mergers, it became 
clear that there are three main types of mergers: horizontal 
mergers, vertical mergers, and potential competition or 
conglomerate mergers. 
As was also presented, the United Nations' “World 
Investment Report 2000” suggests that the recent increase in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions is mainly due to an
increase in the globalization of markets. Supporting this 
fact is the statistic that more than 24,000 [mergers and 
acquisitions] took place during the last 20 years.” The ease 
of communication has undoubtedly been a major factor in 
increasing mergers and acquisitions, since most mergers take 
place in more developed countries.  
To make the process of mergers and acquisitions fair for 
both the consumers and firms in the market several controls 
have been put into place to regulate M&As. The European 
Commission, which investigates the grounds for approving or 
rejecting a merger between two European companies, the FDIC 
and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission are examples of 
these controls. Growth of interest in the concept of a so 
called contestable market effectively complements the idea of 
the free market approach to mergers. By concentrating on 
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removing entry barriers to a market, monopolies and mergers 
can only remain strong by producing high quality products 
efficiently.
To reiterate on the point, the main economic argument 
for rejecting a merger is that mergers and acquisitions 
contribute to the risk of monopolies, because in the case of 
monopolies, consumers become exploited and resources become 
misallocated if these mergers create major entry barriers 
restricting competition, which can potentially lead to market 
failure and a decline in economic welfare. As a case in 
point, JP Morgan Chase is a perfect example of how a smart 
strategic move can make significant improvements to a 
company’s performance. After the acquisition, as we have 
already established the “merger” between Bank One and JP 
Morgan Chase is, the latter company’s market share, revenues, 
and net income all rose to impressive highs, marking the 
initial success of the acquisition. 
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M&A STATS AT A GLANCE: 
Internet M&A hit six-month high in April 2002
Acquirers spent just over $2.7 billion to acquire 120 Internet properties in April as deal 
making revived among destinations and Internet consultancies. Spending reached its highest 
monthly level in six months, while the number of deals reached its third-highest level in the 
past 16 months. A flurry of deals in the e-finance sector, capped by Ameritrade's $1.3 
billion acquisition of Datek, helped fuel activity. Recent pockets of M&A activity within e-
commerce services, such as travel, finance and employment, illustrate the gradual rebuilding 
of faith in certain areas of the dot-com destinations or in sites that were once roundly 
dismissed by many investors. 
Source: Webmergers M&A database.
Internet M&A deals & dollars: past six months
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April M&A spending by Internet sector
April deals by Internet sector
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M&A spending by sector Jan-Apr 2001 vs. 2002
Infrastructure spending increasingly dominates Internet M&A: 
total deal values by category since Q1, 2001
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M&A stats at a glance – asset sales
The Internet shakeout that we examined in last week's M&A Stats at a Glance left a 
veritable smorgasbord of distressed assets for sale. Opportunistic acquirers have bought up 
the assets of at least 300 Internet companies between the first quarter of 2001 and the end of 
the first quarter of 2002. Internet infrastructure companies account for the majority of both 
deals and dollars, as buyers accumulate valuable software and hardware to deploy in the 
next phase of the Internet's development.
Asset sales – number of deals
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Asset sales – dollars
Average asset sale ($000)
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Asset Sales by Quarter
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Source: SNL Financial Services M&A DataSource 
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JP Morgan Chase press release as of January 14, 2004 
JP Morgan Chase/Bank One: The Merger at a Glance 
(potential numbers post merger) 
Two Great Banking Companies 
JP Morgan Chase (as of 9/30/03 ) Bank One (as of 9/30/03) 
- 92,900 employees
- 3rd largest bank holding company in U.S.
- $793 billion assets 
- Operations in virtually every state and more than 50 
countries 
- 71,200 employees 
- 6th largest bank holding company in 
U.S. 
- $290 billion assets 
- 1,800 branches in 14 states 
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When Combined, Top Positions Across the Full Spectrum of Wholesale and Retail 
Financial Services
Retail Banking Investment 
Banking 
Treasury &
Securities 
Services
Investment 
Management & 
Private Banking 
Private 
Equity 
Branch Banking
#4 Branch 
Network 
#2 Core Deposits 
Retail Lending
#2 Credit Card 
#2 Middle Market 
#1 Auto (Non 
Captive) 
#4 Mortgage 
#2 Home Equity 
#1 Global 
Syndicated Loans 
#1 Derivatives 
House 
#2 U.S. Investment 
Grade Corporate 
Debt 
#4 Global Equity & 
Equity-Related 
#5 Global 
Announced M&A 
#1 U.S. Dollar 
Clearing 
#1 U.S. 
Corporate 
Trustee 
#1 Securities 
Lending 
#1 CHIPS, 
Fedwire, ACH 
Origination 
#1 U.S./#3 Global 
Private Bank 
#2 U.S. Active 
Asset Manager 
#2 Global Money 
Market Asset 
Manager 
#4 U.S. Mutual 
Fund Company 
One of the 
largest private 
equity players 
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Second Largest Banking Company in the U.S. (as of 9/30/03, in $millions) 
JP Morgan Chase Bank One Combined 
Loans $236,201 $141,710 $ 377,911 
Assets 792,700 290,006 1,082,706 
Managed Assets 827,015 326,769 1,153,784 
Deposits $313,626 $163,411 $ 477,037 
Total Liabilities 747,743 267,595 1,015,338 
Total Equity 44,957 22,411 67,368 
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A Broad and Balanced Business Mix1
- Consumer Banking & Lending, Mortgage, Auto, Small Business & Middle Market 33%
- Card Services 16%
- Investment Banking 39%
- Treasury & Securities Services 7%
- Investment Management & Private Banking 5%
1Based on combined pre-tax income as of 9/30/03, excluding corporate and private equity 
results. 
Extensive Branch Network
Northeast Midwest Southwest 
New York #1 Illinois #1 Texas #1
Connecticut #8 Indiana #1 Arizona #1
New Jersey #12 Michigan #3 Louisiana #2
Ohio #4 Utah #3
Wisconsin #4 Colorado #5
W. Virginia #4 Oklahoma #6
Kentucky #4
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JPMorgan Chase & Co.
270 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10017-2070
NYSE symbol: JPM
www.jpmorganchase.com
News release: IMMEDIATE RELEASE
JPMORGAN CHASE REPORTS 2004 THIRD QUARTER NET INCOME OF $1.4 BILLION 
AFTER MERGER AND CONFORMING ACCOUNTING CHARGES OF $741 MILLION
• REPORTED EPS of $0.39 per share and OPERATING EPS of $0.60 per share(1)
• INVESTMENT BANK – Weak Trading Results, Strength in Investment Banking Fees
• RETAIL MOMENTUM – Account, Deposit and Loan Growth
• CARD STRENGTH – Growth in Loans and Charge Volume
• CREDIT QUALITY & CAPITAL RATIOS – Remain Strong, Tier 1 Ratio 8.5%
New York, October 20, 2004 – JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM) today reported 2004 third 
quarter net income of $1.4 billion, or $0.39 per share, compared to net income of $1.6 billion, or $0.78 
per share, for the third quarter of 2003. Current period results include $741 million in after-tax charges, or
$0.21 per share, comprised of merger costs of $462 million and charges of $279 million to conform 
accounting policies, reflecting the merger with Bank One Corporation completed on July 1, 2004. 
Excluding these charges, operating earnings would have been $2.2 billion, or $0.60 per share. Prior year 
and second quarter 2004 reported results do not include Bank One. Refer to the “Merger and other 
financial information” section of this press release for additional information concerning the merger.
William B. Harrison, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer commented, “I am pleased with the 
progress to-date on merger integration, but current operating results were below expectations primarily 
due to weak trading results in the Investment Bank. However, I am pleased with the strong results and 
growth exhibited in the Retail Banking and Credit Card businesses.”
James Dimon, President and Chief Operating Officer, commenting on merger integration said, “We 
continue to be on track in all phases of the merger integration. Progress on integration during the 
quarter included the decision on technology insourcing, conversion of 20% of the Bank One credit card 
portfolio in August, and standardization of compensation and benefit plans across the firm, which will 
be implemented beginning in 2005. Additionally, the process of consolidating legal entities gained 
momentum with the merger of our broker-dealers and credit card banks and the planned November 
merger of the lead banks.”
Investor Contact: Ann Borowiec Media Contact: Joe Evangelisti
(212) 270-7318 (212) 270-7438
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In the discussion of the business segments below, information is presented on an operating basis1. Operating basis excludes 
the after-tax impact of litigation charges taken in the second quarter of 2004, merger costs and conformance of accounting 
policies. In the case of Card Services, operating basis excludes the impact of credit card securitizations. For more 
information about operating basis, as well as other non-GAAP financial measures used by management, see Note 1 below.
The following discussion compares the third quarter of 2004 to the third quarter of 2003. Unless otherwise indicated, results 
for the 2003 third quarter are JPMorgan Chase (h-JPMC) on a standalone basis. The proforma combined historical lines of 
business information present the new business segments of the company as if these segments had existed as of the earliest 
date indicated and which reflects (i) the firm’s new business segments, and (ii) purchase accounting adjustments, reporting 
reclassifications and management accounting policy changes. For further information regarding the proforma combined 
historical financial information, including reconciliation to JPMorgan Chase GAAP financial information, see information 
furnished pursuant to Regulation FD by JPMorgan Chase on Form 8-K dated October 1, 2004, as amended on October 20,
2004. In management’s view, the proforma combined historical financial results provide investors with information to 
enable them to understand better the underlying dynamics of each of the lines of business. For a description of the firm’s 
business segments, see Note 2 below.
INVESTMENT BANK (IB)
Operating Results - IB 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues $2,701 ($91) ($501) (3%) (16%)
Provision for Credit Losses (151) 30 147 17 49 
Expenses 1,924 103 4 6 --
Earnings $627 ($66) ($403) (10%) (39%)
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings were $627 million, down 10% from the prior year. These results were positively 
affected by the acquisition of Bank One, offset by weak trading results in Fixed Income Markets.
Revenues of $2.7 billion were down 3%. Investment banking fees of $911 million increased 43% due to 
continued strength in debt underwriting and advisory fees, relatively flat equity underwriting fees and the 
acquisition. Fixed Income Markets revenues of $1.1 billion were down 23%, or $336 million, primarily 
reflecting lower trading results. Equity Markets revenues increased 46% to $455 million due to higher 
trading revenues. Credit Portfolio revenues of $220 million were down 44%, reflecting lower net interest 
income and lending fees and lower gains from workouts, partially offset by revenue from the acquisition.
The  provision  for  credit  losses  was  a  benefit  of  $151  million  reflecting  continued  favorable  credit 
performance.
Expenses of $1.9 billion were up 6% due to the acquisition, increased personnel costs, higher technology 
costs and higher legal costs. These increases were partially offset by reduced levels of performance-
related incentive compensation.
Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Operating earnings were $627 million, down 39% from the prior year. The earnings decline was primarily 
from lower trading results in Fixed Income Markets. In addition, lower loan volumes led to reductions in 
net interest income. These declines were partially offset by higher investment banking fees and improved 
equity trading results.
Revenues of $2.7 billion were down 16%, or $501 million. Investment banking fees of $911 million 
increased 23% due to the continued strength in advisory fees, up 70%, debt underwriting fees, up 16%, 
and relatively flat equity underwriting fees. Fixed Income Markets revenues of $1.1 billion were down
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32%, or $517 million, reflecting lower trading results in both client and portfolio management activities. 
Equity Markets revenues increased 31% to $455 million due to higher trading revenues. Credit Portfolio 
revenues of $220 million were down 55%, reflecting lower net interest income and lending fees from 
reduced loan balances and commitments, as well as lower gains from workouts.
The provision for credit losses was a benefit of $151 million, compared to a $298 million benefit last year. 
The reduction in benefit is attributable to moderating but ongoing improvements in the risk of the loan 
portfolio, reduced loan balances and net loan loss recoveries for the quarter.
Expenses of $1.9 billion were flat to last year and reflected reduced levels of performance-related 
incentive compensation offset by higher personnel costs, technology costs, and legal fees.
Other Highlights Include:
• Loans down significantly to $46 billion from $67 billion in the prior year and $49
billion in the prior quarter.
• Nonperforming assets down to $1.3 billion from $3.2 billion in the prior year.
• Allowance for loan losses to average loans of 4.78% up from 3.82%.
• #1 in U.S. Syndicated Loans with 33% market share year-to-date(3).
• #3 in Global Debt, Equity, and Equity-related(3).
• Improved to #4 from #15 in U.S. IPOs with U.S. Equity & Equity-related #5 down 
from #4(3).
RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES (RFS)
Operating Results - RFS 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues $3,800 $2,271 $410 149% 12%
Provision for Credit Losses 239 81 (136) 51 (36) 
Expenses 2,238 1,152 90 106 4
Earnings $822 $641 $280 354% 52%
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings were $822 million compared to $181 million in the prior year. The primary reason for 
growth was the acquisition of Bank One. Other factors affecting performance included growth in loan and 
deposit balances, higher margin and fee income on deposit products, and improved secondary marketing in 
the prime mortgage business.
Total revenue increased to $3.8 billion, up from $1.5 billion. Net interest income of $2.7 billion, up from
$1.3 billion, benefited from the acquisition and growth in retained loan and core deposit balances, as well 
as wider spreads on deposit products.  Noninterest revenue of $1.1 billion, up from $184 million, benefited 
from the acquisition, higher deposit-related fees and higher revenue associated with hedging of the prime 
mortgage pipeline and warehouse, reflective of hedging losses in the prior year. Both components of total 
revenue included declines related to lower prime mortgage originations.
The provision for credit losses totaled $239 million, compared to $158 million last year, reflecting the
Bank One acquisition. Credit quality trends remain favorable.
Expenses rose to $2.2 billion, from $1.1 billion, primarily due to the acquisition.
58
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
News Release
Home Finance operating earnings were $340 million, up from $115 million last year. Total 
revenues were $1.2 billion, up from $686 million. Operating earnings for the prime production 
and servicing segment were $103 million.  Growth  in  this  segment  reflected  improved 
performance in secondary marketing activities, a result of losses associated with hedging the 
pipeline and warehouse in the prior year. This was partially offset by lower prime mortgage 
production revenue. Earnings for the real estate lending segment increased to $237 million. 
Growth over the prior year was largely due to the acquisition of Bank One, but also reflected 
higher retained loan balances.
Consumer and Small Business operating earnings totaled $377 million, up from $14 million
last year. While growth largely reflected the inclusion of the Bank One retail franchise, it also 
benefited from strong deposit growth and wider spreads. The provision for credit losses 
increased  to  $79  million  reflecting portfolio write-downs  in  both  the  small  business  and 
community development loan portfolios.
Auto Finance operating earnings were $85 million, up from $49 million last year. The increase 
was primarily due to the acquisition of Bank One. Total revenue of $397 million reflected a 
competitive operating environment, which contributed to narrower spreads on new loans and 
reduced origination volumes.
Insurance operating earnings totaled $20 million on gross revenues of $429 million. The 
increase over the prior year was almost entirely due to the acquisition of Bank One.
Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Operating earnings were $822 million, up from $542 million in the prior year. Earnings growth was 
driven by Home Finance, Retail Banking and, to a lesser extent, Insurance. Factors affecting performance 
included growth in loan and deposit balances, higher margin and fee income on deposit products, and 
improved secondary marketing income in the mortgage business.
Total revenue increased to $3.8 billion, up $0.4 billion versus the prior year. Net interest income rose 2% 
to $2.7 billion. The benefits of growth in retained loan and core deposit balances and of wider spreads on 
deposit products were mostly offset by reduced mortgage warehouse balances given a drop in prime 
mortgage originations. Noninterest revenue of $1.1 billion was $0.4 billion better than the prior year. This 
increase included higher deposit-related fees and higher revenue associated with hedging of the prime 
mortgage pipeline and warehouse, reflective of hedging losses in the prior year and was net of declines in 
fees due to lower mortgage originations.
The provision for credit losses totaled $239 million, down $136 million due to reductions in both Home 
and Auto Finance. Credit quality trends remain favorable.
Expenses rose to $2.2 billion, up 4% or $90 million, demonstrating positive operating leverage. The 
increase was largely due to the acquisition of certain Zurich insurance entities and investments in the 
branch distribution network.
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Home Finance operating earnings totaled $340 million, up from $163 million in the prior year. 
Operating earnings for the prime production and servicing segment were $103 million, up $65 
million. Growth in revenue reflected improved performance in secondary marketing activities, a
result of losses associated with hedging the pipeline and warehouse in the prior year. This 
was partially offset by lower prime mortgage production revenue. Earnings for the consumer 
real estate lending segment increased to $237 million, up $111 million. Growth reflected 
increases in retained mortgage and home equity loans, partially offset by a drop in revenue 
associated with gains on sales of sub-prime loans, a result of management’s intent to retain 
these loans on balance sheet rather than to continue to securitize.  The provision for credit losses 
declined due to improved delinquency trends and higher credit costs in the prior year related to a
portfolio that was subsequently sold.
Other Highlights Include:
• Home loan originations of $48 billion, down from $100 billion in the prior year and
$63 billion in the prior quarter.
• Mortgage loans serviced increased to $554 billion from $502 billion.
• Mortgage servicing rights (net) increased from $4.1 billion to $5.2 billion.
• Average mortgage loans retained increased to $44 billion from $35 billion.
• Average home equity loans increased to $66 billion from $55 billion.
• Nonperforming assets declined to $1.0 billion from $1.5 billion.
• Net charge-offs of $63 million declined from $154 million.
Consumer and Small Business operating earnings totaled $377 million, up from $283 million. 
Total revenue of $2.1 billion increased 11%, reflecting strong deposit growth and wider spreads. 
Expenses of $1.4 billion were up 2% primarily due to higher compensation and marketing costs, 
reflecting ongoing investments in the distribution network.
Other Highlights Include:
• Number of branches increased by 97 from the prior year to 2,467.
• Number of ATMs increased by 283 from the prior year to 6,587.
• Core deposits increased to $148 billion, or 9% from prior year.
• Checking accounts grew by 187,000 to 8.1 million during the quarter.
• Number of personal bankers was 5,341, up 442 from the prior year.
Auto Finance operating earnings were $85 million, down 4%. Total revenue of $397 million 
was down $35 million or 8%, reflecting a continued competitive operating environment, which 
contributed to narrower spreads on new loans and reduced origination volumes. The provision 
for credit losses declined to $95 million and the net charge-off rate dropped to 0.64% from
0.79%, but was up from the prior quarter rate of 0.45%.
Other Highlights Include:
• Average loan receivables were $53 billion, up from $50 billion in the prior year and 
down from $54 billion in the prior quarter.
• Lease receivables declined from $12 billion to $9 billion over the past year. Insurance
operating earnings totaled $20 million on gross revenues of $429 million. Compared to last year,
this quarter included three full months of results from the Zurich acquisition, which was acquired
by Bank One in September 2003.
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CARD SERVICES (CS)
Operating Results - CS 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues $3,771 $2,206 $219 141% 6% 
Provision for Credit Losses 1,662 957 (43) 136 (3) 
Expenses 1,437 886 165 161 13 
Earnings $421 $222 $62 112% 17%
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings were $421 million, up $222 million from the prior year primarily due to the Bank One 
acquisition.  In addition to the acquisition, higher loan balances and charge volume positively affected 
results. Partially offsetting these benefits were increased marketing and a higher managed provision for 
credit losses.
Total revenue was $3.8 billion, up $2.2 billion, or 141%. Net interest income of $2.9 billion increased due to
the Bank One acquisition and higher loan balances. Noninterest income of $0.9 billion improved 
because of the acquisition and higher charge volume, which generated increased interchange income.  This 
was partially offset by higher volume-driven payments to partners and rewards expense.
The managed provision for credit losses was $1.7 billion, primarily reflecting the Bank One acquisition. 
Managed provision increased due to higher loan balances partially offset by lower credit losses. Managed 
credit ratios remained strong, benefiting from reduced bankruptcy filings. The managed net charge-off 
ratio for the quarter was 4.88%. The 30-day managed delinquency ratio was 3.81%.
Expenses were $1.4 billion, up 161%, primarily related to the Bank One acquisition. In addition to the 
acquisition and the impact of amortization of purchased credit card relationships, expenses were up due to 
increased marketing expenses.
Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Operating earnings of $421 million were up $62 million, or 17% from the prior year. Higher loan 
balances and spread, increased charge volume, and lower managed provision for credit losses were the 
primary drivers of the increase in earnings.
Total revenue was $3.8 billion, up 6% from $3.6 billion. Net interest income of $2.9 billion increased 6% 
and benefited from the acquisition of a private label portfolio, higher loan balances, and a wider loan 
spread. Noninterest income of $0.9 billion increased 6% due to higher charge volume, which generated 
increased interchange income. This was partially offset by higher volume-driven payments to partners and 
rewards expense. 
 
The managed provision for credit losses was $1.7 billion, down 3%. This decrease was due to lower 
losses, partially offset by the acquisition of a private label portfolio and an increase in the managed 
provision due to higher loan balances. Managed credit ratios remained strong, benefiting from reduced 
bankruptcy filings. The managed net charge-off ratio for the quarter was 4.88%. The 30-day managed 
delinquency ratio was 3.81%.
Expenses of $1.4 billion were up 13% from the prior year. The primary drivers were increased marketing 
costs and the acquisition of a private label portfolio.
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Other Highlights Include:
• Margin as a percentage of average managed loans was 8.90%, up 19 basis points.
• Average managed loans increased $5 billion, or 4%, to $130 billion.
• Charge volume increased $8 billion, or 12%, to $73 billion.
• Merchant processing volume increased $16 billion, or 14%, to $124 billion, and 
total transactions increased by 357 million, or 10%, to 4 billion.
• Managed net charge-off ratio declined to 4.88% from 5.43% in the prior year and
5.56% in the prior quarter.
• 30-day managed delinquency ratio was 3.81%, down from 4.24% in the prior year 
and up from 3.72% in the prior quarter.
• Successfully converted 20%, or 10 million accounts, of the Bank One portfolio to 
the Total Systems processing platform with the remainder scheduled to convert in 
October.
COMMERCIAL BANKING (CB)
Operating Results - CB 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues $833 $492 ($22) 144% (3%)
Provision for Credit Losses 14 (7) (70) (33) (83) 
Expenses 480 267 19 125 4
Earnings $215 $152 $24 241% 13%
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings were $215 million, an increase of $152 million from the prior year, primarily due to 
the acquisition of Bank One.
Revenues were $833 million, an increase of $492 million, primarily as a result of the acquisition of Bank 
One. In addition to the overall increase related to the acquisition, net interest income of $608 million was 
positively affected by improved deposit spreads, and noninterest income of $225 million was negatively 
affected by lower investment banking revenues and lower service charges on deposits.
Provision for credit losses was $14 million for the quarter. Net recoveries for the quarter were $13
million, reflecting the continued improvement in credit quality and a decline in nonperforming loans.
Expenses increased to $480 million, primarily related to the acquisition of Bank One.
Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Operating earnings were $215 million, an increase of $24 million, or 13% from the prior year, resulting 
from continued improvements in credit quality.
Revenues were $833 million, a decline of $22 million, or 3%. Net interest income was $608 million, an 
increase of $19 million, or 3%, related to increased deposit balances and spreads, loan fees, and modest 
loan growth. This improvement was partially offset by lower loan spreads. Noninterest income was $225 
million, a $41 million or 15% decline, due primarily to lower service charges on deposits. As interest 
rates rise, the payment of services through fees, in lieu of balances, such as service charges on deposits, 
often decline. Noninterest income was also negatively impacted by a decline in investment banking 
revenues.
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Provision for credit losses was $14 million for the quarter reflecting the continued improvement in credit 
quality. Net recoveries for the quarter were $13 million, as gross charge-offs declined and recoveries 
remained strong.
Expenses of $480 million were up 4%. Compensation expenses grew by 9% and non-compensation 
expenses were up 2%.
Other Highlights Include:
• Deposits increased 11% to $64.8 billion.
• Average loan balances grew 5% on an annualized basis from second quarter 2004.
• Nonperforming loans declined to $579 million, down almost 50% from $1.1 billion.
• Allowance for loan losses to average loans was 2.68%.
TREASURY & SECURITIES SERVICES (TSS)
Operating Results - TSS 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues $1,339 $433 $140 48% 12%
Expenses 1,156 407 198 54 21 
Earnings $96 ($19) ($29) (17%) (23%)
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings for the quarter were $96 million, down $19 million compared to the prior year. 
Results were negatively affected by an $85 million pre-tax software charge and incremental merger related 
operating costs, partially offset by the acquisition of Bank One, the prior acquisition of the Corporate Trust 
business of Bank One (November 2003), and the acquisition of Electronic Funds Services (EFS).
TSS net revenue increased 48% to $1.3 billion from $906 million. This revenue growth reflects the 
benefit of acquisitions, growth in net interest income due to deposit balances increasing to $139 billion 
and a July 1, 2004 change in corporate deposit pricing methodology. Net revenue also benefited from a
19%  growth  in  assets  under  custody  to  $8.3  trillion,  reflecting  market  appreciation  and  underlying 
business growth. While asset servicing revenues declined, trade-related products, commercial cards, and 
global equity volumes led to increased revenue.
Treasury Services revenue grew to $629 million, Investor Services to $404 million and Institutional Trust 
Services to $306 million. TSS firmwide revenue, which includes reported TSS net revenue and Treasury 
Services net revenue recorded in certain other lines of business, grew 63% to $1.9 billion from $1.2 
billion.
Credit reimbursement to the Investment Bank was $43 million compared to a credit of $10 million 
principally due to the Bank One acquisition and a change in methodology. Management charges TSS a 
credit reimbursement, which is the pre-tax amount of earnings, less cost of capital, related to certain 
exposures managed within the Investment Bank credit portfolio on behalf of clients shared with TSS.
Expenses totaled $1.2 billion compared to $749 million reflecting acquisitions, the $85 million software 
charge, increases in compensation and technology related expenses, and incremental merger related 
operating costs.
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Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Operating earnings for the quarter were $96 million, down $29 million from the prior year. Earnings were 
negatively impacted by an $85 million pre-tax software charge and incremental merger related operating 
costs.
TSS net revenue increased 12% to $1.3 billion from $1.2 billion. This growth reflects the benefit of the 
January 2004 acquisition of EFS. Growth in net interest income was largely due to a 20% increase in 
deposit balances to $139 billion partially offset by deposit spread compression. Net revenue also 
benefited from a 19% growth in assets under custody to $8.3 trillion, reflecting market appreciation and 
underlying business growth. While asset servicing revenues declined, trade related products, commercial 
cards, and global equity volumes led to increased revenue.
Treasury Services revenue grew 22% to $629 million, Investor Services revenue increased 5% to $404 
million and Institutional Trust Services revenue increased 2% to $306 million. TSS firmwide revenue, 
which includes reported TSS net revenue and Treasury Services net revenue recorded in certain other lines of
business, grew 7% to $1.9 billion from $1.8 billion.
Expenses totaled $1.2 billion compared to $958 million reflecting the $85 million software charge, the 
EFS acquisition, increased compensation and technology related expenses, and incremental merger related 
operating costs.
Other Highlights Include:
• Total average deposits of $139 billion, an increase of 20%.
• Assets under custody increased to $8.3 trillion, up 19%.
ASSET & WEALTH  MANAGEMENT (AWM)
Operating Results - AWM 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues $1,193 $433 $97 57% 9% 
Provision for Credit Losses 1 8 4 NM NM 
Expenses 884 249 64 39 8
Earnings $197 $112 $19 132% 11%
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings were $197 million, up 132% from the prior year. The primary reason for this growth 
was the acquisition of Bank One. In addition, performance was driven by global equity market 
appreciation, growth in assets under supervision and net customer flows.
Total revenue was $1.2 billion, up 57% or $433 million. The primary driver of the increase was the Bank 
One acquisition. In addition, asset management fees increased due to global equity market appreciation, 
improved product mix and net asset inflows. Net interest income increased due to higher deposit product 
balances. These improvements were partially offset by lower revenue from brokerage fees and 
commissions.
The provision for credit losses increased due to higher net charge-offs. Nonperforming loans to average 
loans decreased to 0.49% from 0.75% and the allowance for loan losses to average loans was 0.95%.
Expenses were $884 million, up 39%, due to the Bank One acquisition and increased compensation 
expenses.
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Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Operating earnings were $197 million, up 11% from the prior year. Performance was driven by global 
equity market appreciation, growth in assets under supervision, and net customer inflows.
Revenues were $1.2 billion, up 9%. Asset management fees were up 9% to $859 million. In addition, net 
interest income was up 11% to $269 million, benefiting from higher deposit product balances. These 
improvements were partially offset by lower revenue from brokerage fees and commissions.
Provision for credit losses increased primarily due to higher net charge-offs. Nonperforming loans to 
average loans decreased to 0.49% from 0.86% and the allowance for loan losses to average loans was
0.95%.
Expenses of $884 million increased 8%, reflecting increased compensation expenses.
Other Highlights Include:
• Assets under supervision were $1.17 trillion, an increase of 8%.
• Assets under management were $735 billion, an increase of 5%.
• Loans were up 12% to $25.4 billion.
• Deposits were up 23% to $38.5 billion.
• Announced intention to acquire a majority interest in Highbridge Capital
Management, a leading hedge fund with $7 billion in assets under management.
CORPORATE
Operating Results - Corporate 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues ($86) ($446) ($170) NM NM 
Expenses 506 434 138 NM 38% 
Earnings ($219) ($511) ($168) NM NM 
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings were a loss of $219 million down from earnings of $292 million in the prior year. 
Corporate  includes  the  firm’s  treasury  activities,  private  equity  business,  and  unallocated  corporate 
expenses.
Noninterest income was $414 million, down $16 million from the prior year. The primary components of 
noninterest income are securities and private equity gains (losses), which totaled $347 million, roughly flat 
with the prior year.
Net interest income was negative $500 million compared to negative $72 million in the prior year. The 
decline was driven primarily by actions and policies adopted in  conjunction with the Bank One 
acquisition.
Corporate unallocated expenses of $506 million were up $434 million from the prior year, due to the Bank 
One acquisition and policies adopted in conjunction with the acquisition. These expenses include the 
expenses of the private equity and global treasury businesses.
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Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Corporate net loss totaled $219 million, which compares to a net loss of $51 million in the prior year. 
Noninterest income was $414 million, an increase of $154 million over the prior year. Noninterest 
income included $109 million of gains on sale of treasury investment securities which was flat compared 
to the prior year. Also included in noninterest income were private equity gains of $235 million, $80 
million lower than the prior year, which included a sizeable gain in One Equity Partners’ portfolio. The 
book value of the private equity portfolio at the end of the quarter was $8.1 billion, down from $9.9 billion in
the prior year.  The investment portfolio quarterly average balance was $65.5 billion, down $28.5 
billion from the prior year.
Net interest income was negative $500 million versus negative $176 million in the prior year. The 
decrease was primarily driven by a $28.5 billion reduction from the prior year in the firm’s quarterly 
average treasury investment portfolio.
Corporate unallocated expenses of  $506 million were up $138 million from the prior year. These 
expenses include the expenses of the private equity and global treasury businesses.  Compensation 
expenses were up $105 million primarily due to incentive compensation. Non-compensation expenses 
were up $63 million primarily related to technology costs.
JPMORGAN CHASE (JPMC)
Operating Results - JPMC 3Q03 $ O/(U) 3Q03 % O/(U)
($ millions) 3Q04 h-JPMC Proforma h-JPMC Proforma
Revenues $13,551 $5,300 $173 64% 1% 
Provision for credit losses 1,764 1,070 (100) 154% (5%) 
Expenses 8,625 3,498 678 68 9
Earnings $2,159 $531 ($215) 33% (9%)
Discussion of Historical Results:
Operating earnings were $2.2 billion, up $531 million, or 33% from the prior year due to the acquisition of
Bank One.
Total revenues were $13.6 billion, up $5.3 billion or 64%, due to the acquisition.  Noninterest revenues 
were $6.7 billion, up $2.1 billion or 45% from the prior year, benefiting from higher mortgage and 
investment banking fees, partially offset by lower trading revenues. Net interest income was $6.8 billion, 
up $3.2 billion from the prior year, primarily due to the acquisition.
The provision for credit losses was $1.8 billion, up 154% primarily due to the Bank One acquisition. 
Total wholesale (includes IB, CB, AWM, and TSS) provision for credit losses was a benefit of $137 
million for the quarter, compared to a benefit of $169 million in the prior year. The wholesale loan 
charge-off rate was a benefit of 0.08% for the quarter due to net loan loss recoveries, compared to a net 
charge-off rate of 1.25% in the prior year. Credit quality in the consumer (includes RFS and CS) portfolio 
reflects reduced bankruptcy filings and favorable delinquency trends. The managed net charge-off rate for 
Card Services declined to 4.88% from 5.84% in the prior year. Retail Financial Services net charge-off 
rate was 0.47% compared to 0.37% in the prior year. The firm had total nonperforming assets of $3.6 
billion at September 30, 2004, down 6% from the prior year’s level of $3.9 billion.
Expenses of $8.6 billion were up $3.5 billion from the prior year. Compensation expenses of $4.1 billion 
drove $1.4 billion of the increase, related primarily to the acquisition and to higher incentive
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compensation. Non-compensation expenses of $4.6 billion increased $2.1 billion due to the affect of the 
acquisition and, to a lesser extent, higher technology expenses.
Discussion of Proforma Combined Results:
Operating earnings were $2.2 billion, down $215 million from the prior year. The decrease in earnings 
was caused by an increase in expenses of $678 million, partially offset by a revenue increase of $173 
million and a lower provision for credit losses of $100 million.
Total revenues were $13.6 billion, up $173 million. Noninterest revenues were $6.7 billion, up 6% due to 
higher mortgage fees, other income, investment banking fees, and asset management, administration and 
commissions, partially offset by lower trading revenues. Net interest income was $6.8 billion, down $212 
million, or 3%. The decline was due to the reduction in the investment portfolio, partially offset by higher 
spreads on deposits and higher deposit balances.
The provision for credit losses was $1.8 billion, down 5%. Total wholesale provision for credit losses was a
benefit of $137 million for the quarter, compared to a benefit of $216 million in the prior year. The 
wholesale loan charge-off rate was a benefit of 0.08% for the quarter due to net loan loss recoveries, 
compared to a net charge-off rate of 0.96% in the prior year. Total consumer managed provision for credit 
losses remained stable at $1.9 billion, reflecting lower charge-offs,  lower  bankruptcies  and  positive 
delinquency trends. The managed net charge-off rate for Card Services declined to 4.88% from 5.43% in 
the prior year. Retail Financial Services net charge-off rate was 0.47% compared to 0.77% in the prior 
year. The improvement compared to the prior year reflects the run-off  of  higher  risk,  non-strategic 
portfolios. The firm had total nonperforming assets of $3.6 billion at September 30, 2004, down 46% from 
the prior year’s level of $6.8 billion.
Expenses were $8.6 billion, up $678 million or 9% from the prior year driven primarily by an 11% 
increase in non-compensation expenses to $4.6 billion. The increase was due to higher technology 
expenses, technology impairment charges, higher marketing expenses, higher occupancy costs and higher 
professional services expenses.
Compensation expenses were $4.1 billion, up 6% or $240 million, primarily driven by salaries and 
benefits including higher incentive compensation. The increase in incentive compensation is largely 
driven by higher restricted stock amortization and also includes the cost of expensing stock options. 
Incentive compensation is adjusted regularly to reflect year-to-date performance.
Other Corporate Items
• Tier 1 capital ratio was 8.5% at September 30, 2004 (estimated), 8.2% at June 30, 2004 and
8.7% at September 30, 2003.
• During the quarter 3.5 million shares of common stock were repurchased at an average 
price of $38.89 per share.
• Headcount of 162,200 is down 5,300 since January 1, 2004.
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Merger and other financial information
• Merger  between  JPMorgan  Chase  &  Co.  and  Bank  One  Corporation: On July 1, 2004, 
JPMorgan Chase and Bank One completed the merger of their holding companies. The merger 
was accounted for as a purchase. Accordingly, the earnings for JPMorgan Chase and Bank One 
are combined for the third quarter; all other time periods on a reported basis are JPMorgan Chase 
only.
• Merger saves and costs: Management continues to estimate annual merger savings  of 
approximately $3.0 billion. Approximately two-thirds of the savings are anticipated to be realized 
by the end of 2005. During the third quarter of 2004, approximately $140 million of merger 
savings were realized. The total headcount of the firm has been reduced by 5,300 since December
31, 2003 and by 3,300 since June 30, 2004. Management continues to estimate one-time merger 
costs of approximately $4.0 billion. Of the $4.0 billion, approximately $1.0 billion was accounted 
for as purchase accounting adjustments and recorded as goodwill during the third quarter of 2004. 
Of the remaining $3.0 billion of merger costs, approximately $752 million (pre-tax) were incurred in
the third quarter of 2004. The remaining $2.2 billion is expected to be incurred over the next 
three years.
• Conformance of accounting policies: As part of the merger, certain accounting policies and 
practices were conformed, resulting in charges to income. It is estimated that in the third and 
fourth quarters these charges will aggregate approximately $1.2 billion (pre-tax), slightly lower 
than the original estimate of $1.3 billion to $1.5 billion. The largest impact is related to the 
decertification of the seller’s retained interest in credit card securitizations. During the third 
quarter of 2004 net charges of $451 million (pre-tax) were taken to conform accounting policies, of 
which $721 million (pre-tax) related to the decertification of the seller’s retained interest in credit 
card securitizations. It is anticipated a similar amount, approximately $721 million, will be taken 
in the fourth quarter of 2004 related to the decertification of credit card securitizations.
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Notes:
1. In addition to analyzing the firm’s results on a reported basis, management reviews the line of business results on an 
operating basis, which is a non-GAAP financial measure. The definition of operating basis starts with the reported 
U.S. GAAP results. In the case of the Investment Bank, operating basis includes in trading revenue net interest 
income related to trading activities. Trading activities generate revenues that are recorded for GAAP purposes in two line
items on the income statement: trading revenue, which includes the mark to market gains or losses on trading 
positions; and net interest income, which includes the interest income or expense related to those positions. 
Combining both the trading revenue and related net interest income enables management to evaluate the Investment 
Bank’s trading activities, by considering all revenue related to these activities, and facilitates operating comparisons to 
other competitors. In the case of Chase Cardmember Services, operating or managed basis excludes the impact of 
credit card securitizations on revenue, the provision for credit losses, net charge-offs and receivables. JPMorgan Chase 
uses the concept of “managed receivables” to evaluate the credit performance of the underlying credit card loans, both 
sold and not sold; as the same borrower is continuing to use the credit card for ongoing charges, a borrower’s credit 
performance will impact both the receivables sold under SFAS 140 and those not sold. Thus, in its disclosures 
regarding managed receivables, JPMorgan Chase treats the sold receivables as if they were still on the balance sheet in 
order to disclose the credit performance (such as charge-off rates) of the entire managed credit card portfolio. 
Operating basis excludes the litigation reserve charge taken in the second quarter of 2004 and merger costs, as 
management believes these items are not part of the firm’s normal daily business operations and, therefore, not 
indicative of trends, and also do not provide meaningful comparisons with other periods. See page 7 of JPMorgan 
Chase’s Earnings Release Financial Supplement (Third Quarter 2004) for a reconciliation of JPMorgan Chase’s 
income statement from reported to operating basis.
2. Following the merger with Bank One, JPMorgan Chase reorganized its business segments. The Investment Bank now 
includes portions of Bank One’s Commercial Bank; Global Treasury has been transferred to the Corporate segment. 
Retail Financial Services is comprised of Chase Financial Services, excluding Card Services and Middle Market and 
includes Bank One’s Retail line of business and insurance activities. Card Services is the combination of Chase Card 
Services and Bank One Card Services. The Commercial Banking segment is comprised of Chase Middle Market, and the
Middle Market portion of Bank One’s Commercial Bank. Treasury & Securities Services added Bank One’s 
Global Treasury Services (formerly in Commercial Bank). Asset & Wealth Management is JPMorgan Chase’s 
Investment Management & Private Bank plus Bank One’s Investment Management Group (excluding insurance 
activity). The Corporate segment is Bank One’s Corporate line of business excluding discontinued loan and lease 
portfolios (now in Retail Financial Services), plus JPMorgan Partners and Global Treasury.
3. Thomson Financial market share data is proforma for the merger of JPMorgan Chase and Bank One.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE: JPM) is a leading global financial services firm with assets of $1.1 
trillion and operations in more than 50 countries. The firm is a leader in investment banking, financial 
services for consumers and businesses, financial transaction processing, asset and wealth management, 
and private equity. A component of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, JPMorgan Chase & Co. has its 
corporate headquarters in New York and its U.S. retail financial services and commercial banking 
headquarters in Chicago. Under the JPMorgan, Chase and Bank One brands, the firm serves millions 
of consumers in the United States and many of the world's most prominent corporate, institutional and 
government clients. Information about the firm is available at www.jpmorganchase.com.
JPMorgan Chase will host a meeting and a conference call for the investment community today at
9:00 a.m. (Eastern Time) to review third quarter financial results. The meeting will be held at 270
Park Avenue on the 49th floor. Investors unable to attend the meeting can dial (973) 935-8515 or 
listen   via   live   audio   webcast.   The   webcast   and   presentation   slides   will   be   available   on 
www.jpmorganchase.com. A replay of the meeting will be available beginning at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern 
Time) on October 20, 2004 and continuing through 6:00 p.m. (Eastern Daylight Time) on October 27,
2004 at (973) 341-3080 pin #5194846. The replay also will be available on www.jpmorganchase.com. 
Additional detailed financial, statistical and business-related information is included in a financial 
supplement. The earnings release and the financial supplement are available on the JPMorgan Chase 
web site (www.jpmorganchase.com).
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This earnings release/presentation contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements are based upon the current beliefs 
and expectations of JPMorgan Chase’s management and are subject to significant risks and 
uncertainties. Actual results may differ from those set forth in the forward-looking statements.
The following factors, among others, could cause actual results to differ from those set forth in the 
forward-looking statements: the risk that the cost savings and any revenue synergies from the merger 
may not be fully realized or may take longer to realize than expected; the risk that excess capital is not 
generated from the merger as anticipated or not utilized in an accretive manner; and the risk that 
disruption  from  the  merger  may  make  it  more  difficult  to  maintain  relationships  with  clients, 
employees or suppliers. Additional factors that could cause JPMorgan Chase’s results to differ 
materially from those described in the forward-looking statements can be found in the Quarterly 
Report on Form 10-Q for the quarters ended June 30, 2004 and March 31, 2004, and in the 2003
Annual Report on Form 10-K of JPMorgan Chase filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and available at the Securities and Exchange Commission’s internet site (http://www.sec.gov).
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JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
(in millions, except per share, ratio and headcount data)
Heritage JPMC Only 3QTR 2004 H-JPMC Only YTD 2004
3QTR 2QTR 3QTR Change Year-to-date Change
SELECTED INCOME STATEMENT
2004 2004 2003 2Q 2004 3Q 2003 2004 2003 2003
Revenue $ 12,505 $ 8,631 $ 7,780 45 % 61 % $ 30,147 $ 25,278 19 %
Provision for Credit Losses 1,169 203 223 476 424 1,387 1,401 (1) 
Noninterest Expense 9,377 9,503 5,127 (1) 83 24,973 16,558 51
Net Income (Loss) 1,418 (548) 1,628 NM (13) 2,800 4,855 (42)
Per Common Share:
Net Income Per Share - Diluted 0.39 (0.27) 0.78 NM (50) 1.06
2.35 (55) Cash Dividends Declared Per Share 0.34 0.34
0.34 - - 1.02 1.02 - Book Value Per Share
29.42 21.52 21.55 37 37
Closing Share Price 39.73 38.77 34.33 2 16
Common Shares Outstanding:
Average - Diluted 3,592.0 2,042.8 2,068.2 76 74 2,598.5 2,047.0 27
Common Shares at Period-end 3,564.1 2,087.5 2,039.2 71 75
SELECTED RATIOS:
Return on Common Equity ("ROE") (a) 5 % NM 15 % NM (1,000) bp 6 % 15 % (900) bp 
Return on Equity-Goodwill ("ROE-GW") (a) (b) 9 NM 18 NM (900) 8 19 (1,100) 
Return on Assets ("ROA") (a) (c) 0.50 NM 0.83 NM (33) 0.42 0.84 (42)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 8.5 8.2 % 8.7 30 bp (20) 
Total Capital Ratio 11.9 11.2 12.1 70 (20) 
SELECTED BALANCE SHEET (Period-end)
Total Assets $ 1,138,469 $ 817,763 $ 792,700 39 % 44 %
Wholesale Loans 132,344 77,044 74,847 72 77
Consumer Loans 261,357 148,894 150,440 76 74
Deposits 496,454 346,539 313,626 43 58
Common Stockholders' Equity 104,844 44,932 43,948 133 139
Headcount 162,275 94,615 95,931 72 69
LINE OF BUSINESS EARNINGS
Investment Bank $ 627 $ 644 $ 693 (3) (10) $ 2,288 $ 1,996 15 %
Retail Financial Services 822 396 181 108 354 1,424 1,242 15
Card Services 421 176 199 139 112 759 510 49
Commercial Banking 215 65 63 231 241 354 218 62
Treasury & Securities Services 96 101 115 (5) (17) 295 299 (1) 
Asset & Wealth Management 197 99 85 99 132 418 181 131
Corporate (d) (219) 325 292 NM NM 357 409 (13)
Total Operating Earnings 2,159 1,806 1,628 20 33 5,895 4,855 21
Reconciling Items (Net of Taxes):
Merger Costs (462) (60) - NM NM (522) - NM 
Litigation Reserve Charge - (2,294) - NM NM (2,294) - NM 
Accounting Policy Conformity (279) - - NM NM (279) - NM
Net Income (Loss) $ 1,418 $ (548) $ 1,628 NM (13) $ 2,800 $ 4,855 (42)
Note: Effective July 1, 2004, Bank One Corporation (“Bank One”), merged with and into JPMorgan Chase. Bank One’s results of operations are included in JPMorgan Chase’s results beginning July 1,
2004. In accordance with U.S. GAAP, the results of operations for the quarter and year-to-date periods ended September 30, 2004, reflect three months of results of operations for the combined Firm.
The results of operations for all other quarterly periods presented herein, and for the nine months ended September 30, 2003, reflect only the results of operations for
heritage JPMorgan Chase.
(a) Based on annualized amounts.
(b) Net income applicable to common stock / Total average common equity (net of goodwill). The Firm uses return on equity less goodwill, a non-GAAP financial measure, to evaluate the
operating performance of the Firm. The Firm utilizes this measure to facilitate operating comparisons to other competitors.
(c) U.S. GAAP earnings / Total average assets
(d) Includes Global Treasury, Private Equity, Support Units and the net effects remaining at the corporate level after the implementation of management accounting policies.
NM - Not meaningful due to net loss.
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